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SMALL ISSUE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS:
THE GROWING ABUSE
Section 103(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 (I.R.C.) ex-
empts the interest paid on obligations of states and their political sub-
divisions from federal income taxation.' Section 103(b)3 similarly ex-
empts the interest on certain industrial development bonds (IDBs).4 IDBs
are a device that states and municipalities employ to induce private in-
dustry to locate in a particular area Typically, a state or political subdi-
vision issues an IDB under the name of the state or subdivision and
makes the proceeds available to a selected private business for quasi-
public or private ventures.' The IDBs normally are backed only by the
I.R.C. § 103(a)(1).
Id. Under I.R.C. § 103(a)(1), obligations of a state or its political subdivisions, a ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia are not taxable insofar as gross income does not include
the interest paid on the obligations. See id. Gross income does not include interest on the
obligations except as §§ 103(c) & (d) provide. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (1972). In the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Congress redesignated § 103(c) so that the current subsection is labeled
103(b). See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 190 (1976).
Whether an investor prefers taxable or tax-free investments depends foremost on his
marginal tax rate. See Note, The Limited Tax-Exempt Status of Interest on Industrial
Development Bonds Under Subsection 103(c1 of the Internal Revenue Code, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1649, 1658 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Limited Tax-Exempt Status].
3 I.R.C. § 103(b).
See id. (4)-(7); text accompanying notes 17-19 infra.
' See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SMALL ISSUE INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS
at xii (1981) [hereinafter cited as SMALL ISSUE]; Doyle, Recent Rulings on Tax-Exempt
Financing Highlight Restrictive IRS Positions, 58 TAXES 175, 175 (1980); Note, State and
Local Industrial Location Incentives-A Well Stocked Candy Store, 5 J. CORP. L. 517, 532
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Industrial Location Incentives]; text accompanying notes 76-78
infra. Many state constitutions contain express prohibitions against lending the states'
credit for private purposes. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. 8, § 2; N.C.
CONST. art. V, § 4; VA. CONST. art. 10, § 10; Comment, Revenue Bonds Financing Home Mort-
gages: Can This Governmental Role Overcome Constitutional and Pragmatic Obstacles, 12
TOL. L. REv. 429, 434 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional and Pragmatic Obstacles]
(compilation of state constitutional credit clauses). To avoid any constitutional attack,
however, many states have enacted constitutional amendments specifically authorizing IDB
financing. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14 (authorizing municipalities to issue IDB's); ME.
CONST. art. IX, § 8 (municipality permitted to issue IDBs when authorized by majority of
registered voters); NEB. CONST. art IX, § 16 (authorizing local units to issue IDBs); OHIO
CONST. art. VIII, § 13 (IDB financing in public purpose). See generally Mitchell v. North
Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 143-50, 159 S.E.2d 745, 753-60 (1968) (discus-
sion of constitutional provisions); text accompanying notes 6 & 111-19 infra.
I See H. HUNKER, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 163 (1974) [hereinafter cited as H.
HUNKER]; SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON TAX-EXEMPT "SMALL ISSUE" INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS 1 (Comm. Print 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM. REPORT]. Financing private projects with IDBs typically
begins with the governmental issuance of the bonds. See Constitutional and Pragmatic
Obstacles, supra note 5, at 436. The governmental borrower uses the bond proceeds to con-
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credit of the private business.7 If the IDB qualifies as tax-exempt, the
selected business receives the equivalent of a low-interest loan as a
direct result of the section 103(b) tax exemption.'
Originally, all IDBs were tax-exempt.' The purpose of the tax exemp-
tion was to encourage investment in small industries."0 The growth in
IDB volume and abuse of the IDB tax exemption by large corporations in
the 1960s, however, led Congress to repeal the tax exemption of virtual-
ly all IDBs. Congress continued to allow the tax exemption for certain ac-
tivities12 and for "small issues" under certain dollar amounts. 3 Despite
struct the desired facility. See id. The governmental unit or authority then rents the facility
to the private concern at a rate which equals the total obligation owed to the bondholders.
See id. After the private concern has satisfied all obligations of the -IDB, the issuing author-
ity normally either sells the facility to the private concern at a nominal cost or continues to
rent the ficilities to the private concern. See id; notes 32 & 84 infra.
I See R. PRICE, ABC's OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as R. PRICE]. If the private IDB user defaults on the bond payments, the governmental
issuer's credit is unaffected. See id.
8 See SUBCoMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. IDB's typically finance privately-owned
projects. The private user desiring tax-exempt financing often has no choice but to employ
IDB financing, structuring the issue so as to gain tax-exempt status either through the
small issue IBD or through an exempt activity IDB. See Constitutional and Pragmatic
Obstacles, supra note 5, at 436; text accompanying notes 12-13 infra. The advantage of IDB
financing to a small company without other financing options is that the small company can
start up or expand the business without having to absorb the high initial investment in con-
struction. See id. Assuming that a tax-exempt IDB pays three percent less annually in in-
terest than a taxable bond, for example, a business financing with a $10 million twenty-year
small issue IDB would save $6 million in interest over the period of the bond. See Industrial
Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 536; text accompanying note 6 supra & note 54 infra.
'See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at xvi.
1o See id.; text accompanying notes 17 & 57-61 infra.
" See The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107, 82
Stat. 267 (1968) (amending I.R.C. § 103, adding subsection (c)) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Act];
Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 543; note 2 supra. The estimated average
size of IDBs at the time of the 1968 Act was $8,500,000. See Industrial Location Incentives,
supra note 5, at 543; note 19 infra.
12 See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4). The 1968 Act provided exceptions to the rule that interest on
IDBs would be taxable. See id. If substantially all of the proceeds of the IDB finance either
acquisition of residential real property for family units, sports facilities, convention or trade
show facilities, airports, wharves, mass-commuting facilities, parking facilities, certain
training facilities, sewage or solid waste control facilities, air or water pollution control
facilities, or the purchase of land for industrial parks, then the investor in the IDB would
not lose his tax-exempt status. See id.; text accompanying notes 31 & 41 infra.
" See I.R.C. § 13(b)(5). Bonds issued as part of an issue of $1 million or less, labeled
small issues, remained tax exempt after the 1968 Act. See id.; text accompanying notes
32-35 infra. With the $1 million restriction imposed, the 1968 Act severely hampered use of
the IDB's as an industrial location incentive. See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note
5, at 543; text accompanying notes 53 infra.
Today, forty-seven states have enabling legislation permitting the use of small issues,
although some states are more restrictive than others. See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at xii
& 71; text accompanying notes 111-19 infra. The District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho and
Washington do not allow small issue IDBs. See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 71; notes
111-15 infra. Some form of IDB is available in all fifty states. See Industrial Location Incen-
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congressional reform, large commercial enterprises continue to qualify
for tax-exempt small issue IDBs.'4 One reason for the ability of large
businesses to abuse small issue IDBs stems from ambiguous language in
section 103(b).11 More importantly, current abuse of the tax exemption of
IDBs results from the liberalization of state IDB enabling laws."
The original purpose of the IDB tax exemption was to aid small in-
dustry and to reduce the level of unemployment in economically
distressed areas." From the inception of IDB financing in 193611 until
1968, the number of large companies using IDBs alarmed Congress and
the Treasury. 9 Opponents of IDB financing argued that the tax-exempt
tives, supra note 5, at 534 & 673-674 (1980) (Appendices III-V) (complete collection of states'
IDB enabling statutes); text accompanying notes 111-19 infra.
" See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 4 (IDBs for national retail furniture chain, national
fast food restaurant, private golf course and country club). In Pennsylvania and Minnesota,
commercial projects now outnumber the original and common industrial uses of IDBs. See
id. at 18. Other increasingly common commercial uses of IDBs include financing of grocery
stores, automobile dealerships, ice cream parlors, bowling alleys, beach resorts, skating
rinks, for-profit hospitals and nursing homes, bank branches, office buildings and ski
resorts. See id at 18-19; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on
Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 224-231 (1981) (statement of Jay Angoff, Public
Citizen's Congress Watch) (IDB financing of adult bookstores) [hereinafter cited as Sub-
comm. Hearings]; text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 62-74 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
"7 See, e.g.,114 CONG.REc. 30603 (1968) (statement of Rep. Mills); Proposed Legislation
Relating to Amendment of Internal Revenue Code: Hearings on H.R. 15414 Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1968) (statement of Ribicoff)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on H.R. 15414]; Industrial Location Incentives, supra
note 5, at 540; Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1654; SMALL ISSUE, supra note
5, at xiv, 10 & 12; note 43 infra.
" See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 4, at 7. Mississippi in 1936 was the first state to
authorize tax-exempt IDB financing. See id. Two years later, the Mississippi Supreme
Court upheld the IDB's enabling act. See Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, -,
178 So. 799, 810 (as a question of state law), appeal dismissed per curiam, 303 U.S. 627
(1938). Mississippi's "Balance Agriculture With Industry Program" authorized
municipalities to acquire land and construct facilities for commercial, industrial,
agricultural, and manufacturing purposes. See Miss. Laws. 1st Extraord. Sess. 1936; MIss.
CODE Ann. §§ 57-1-1-51 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1979). Municipalities would then lease these
enterprises, assuming both a state board and the electorate of the municipalities first ap-
proved the project. See Note, The 'Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing for Industrial
Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 790 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Public Purpose]. The Albrit-
ton court approved the plan. 181 Miss. at -, 178 So. at 810; see SMALL ISSUE, supra note
5, at 7. By dismissing the appeal of the decision for lack of a substantial federal question, the
United States Supreme Court narrowly restricted federal court review of the policies
underlying IDB financing. See 303 U.S. at 627; Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5,
at 528; note 81 infra.
1, See, e.g., 114 CONG. RE0. 909 (1968) (Treasury Department Memorandum) (increase
of IDBs in the 1960's); 114 CONG. REc. 8147 (1968) (comments of Sen. Ribicoff) (flood of IDBs);
114 CONG. REc. 8152 (comments of Sen. Proxmire) (IDBs in great number); SMALL ISSUE,
supra note 5, at 2 & 7-9; Hellige, Industrial Development Bonds: The Disclosure Dilemma, 6
J. CoRP. L. 291, 300 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hellige]; Industrial Location Incentives,
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status of IDBs caused a significant erosion of the federal tax base." More
importantly, opponents argued that IDB financing created pressures in
the municipal bond market by increasing competition for funds normally
used for conventional municipal projects such as road building or
schools.21
supra note 5, at 541-545; Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1651-1652 (debate en-
sued seeking best method to remove tax-exempt status of IDBs while preserving tax-
exempt status for more conventional municipal bonds). In 1956, bond issuers publicly placed
twenty-four IDB issues averaging $267,000 per issue. See 114 CONG. REc. 909 (1968)
(Treasury Department Memorandum); Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1651.
By 1967, the number of issues per year increased to 133 averaging $3,700,000 per issue. See
114 CONG. REC. 909 (1968) (Treasury Department Memorandum); Limited Tax-Exempt
Status, supra note 2, at 1651. The annual volume of IDBs from 1960 to 1968 rose from $100
million to $1.8 billion. See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 8 (reported sales only); note 11
supra and note 51 infra. In 1968 the Treasury Department was reconsidering its position on
the tax-exempt status of interest paid on IDBs because the real debtor of the IDB was the
private corporation and not the governmental authority. See Treasury Department,
Technical Information Release No. 972 (March 6, 1968) (TIR 972); I. COHEN, MUNICIPAL BOND
PROBLEMS 80 (1969) [hereinafter cited as I. COHEN]; Senate Hearings on H.R. 15414, supra
note 17, at 94-95 (reprint of TIR 972). On March 23, 1968, the Internal Revenue Service
(I.R.S.) published Proposed Regulation § 1.103-7 which would have removed the IDB from
treatment as an obligation of the state or other governmental unit under § 103, thereby sub-
jecting the interest on all IDBs to tax. See I. COHEN, supra at 81. On May 15, 1968, the I.R.S.
indefinitely postponed the hearings on the proposed regulation because Congress was con-
sidering legislation for IDBs. See id. at 81. The I.R.S. later withdrew the proposed regula-
tion after the passage of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. See id. at 83-84;
text accompanying notes 22-28 infra.
See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1651-55; text accompanying note
52 infra. The Treasury Department estimated that in 1968, for a taxpayer in the 50% tax
bracket, the Treasury lost an average of $2.28 on each $100 of capital invested in IDBs. See
Senate Hearings on H.R. 15414, supra note 17, at 114-15; note 52 infra. Moreover the IDB
tax exemption is regressive insofar as the taxpayer with a higher marginal tax rate saves
more by investing in IDB's than does another taxpayer in a lower tax bracket. See Limited
Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1652; note 51 infra. Tax-exempt IDB's, therefore, are a
potential tax haven for high-income individuals. See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra
note 2, at 1654; note 51 infra.
"I See, e.g., Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 2, at 1654; SMALL ISSUES, supra
note 5, at 9. The general obligation bond, traditionally the predominant form of municipal
financing, competes for the same funds as IDB's. See Greenberg, Municipal Securities:
Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URB. LAW. 338, 340 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Greenberg]. The "full faith and credit" of the issuing governmental authority backs the
general obligation bond, and normally either ad valorem property tax, income tax or sales
tax revenues secure the bonds. See id.; text accompanying note 131 infra. Other types of
long-term municipal bonds include limited guarantee bonds, special tax bonds and revenue
bonds. See Greenberg, supra at 341.
Increased investment in exempt IDB's results in a reduction of the supply of money
available for true municipal purposes. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on H.R. 15414, supra note
17, at 81-82 (statement of Sen. Ribicoff) (IDBs' effect on interest rates poses a serious threat
to state and local borrowing ability) (cost of local government rises as more tax-exempt
bonds are issued); 114 CONG. REC. 26414 (1968) (comments of Sen. Ribicoff) (IDBs put upward
pressure on interest rates); 114 CONG. REC. 26415 (1968) (comments of Sen. Proxmire) (IDBs
create disruption in the market for legitimate obligations of state and local governments);
Public Purpose, supra note 18, at 793; note 51 infra. The reduced money supply forces a
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To counteract the disturbing increase in IDB investment and to
retard widespread abuse of the municipal bond tax exemption," Con-
gress enacted the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 (1968
Act).' The 1968 Act eliminated the tax-exempt status of IDBs with cer-
tain exceptions. 4 Section 103(a)(1) provides a tax exemption for all
obligations of states and their political subdivisions.' Section 103(b)(1)
denies IDBs the section 103(a)(1) tax exemption.' Section 103(b),
however, provides exceptions which preserve the tax-exempt status' of
certain IDBs.Y Unless the IDB qualifies as an exception to the rule of
Section 103(b)(1), the interest earned from an IDB is taxable.' Therefore,
the first inquiry in determining whether an obligation is tax-exempt
under section 103(b) is whether the obligation is an IDB. 9 If the obliga-
tion is an IDB, the next inquiry is whether the IDB qualifies as an excep-
tion to section 103(b(1)2"
One of the exceptions to section 103(b)(1) includes small issue IDBs as
defined in section 103(b)(6).31 The other exception includes IDBs to
state or municipality to offer higher interest rates on municipal bonds simply because of
supply and demand principles. See text accompanying note 92 infra. States and municipali-
ties must then recover'the extra interest by increasing state and local taxes. See 114 Cong
Rec. 7685 (1968) (editorial submitted by Sen. Nelson) (taxpayer assumes extra burden
because of IDB's); Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1654; text accompanying
note 115 infra. While many people opposed IDBs because of the general abuse of the
muhicipals tax exemption, others viewed taxation of municipal bond interest an imper-
missable impairment by the federal government of the state's borrowing power. See Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 584 (tax on municipal bond interest unconstitu-
tional), vacated on other grounds, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra
note 2 at 1652; note 6 supra. But see U.S. CONST. amend XIII (congressional power to tax in-
come from whatever source derived); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938) (up-
holding federal tax on state employees' incomes).
" See note 19 supra & text accompanying note 44 infra.
" See note 11 supra & text accompanying note 44 infra.
2 See I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) & (4-(7); notes 12-13 supra and notes 31-35 infra.
, See I.R.C. § 103(a)(1); note 2 supra.
,s I.R.C. § 103(b)(1).
' See I.R.C. § 193(b)(4)-(7); notes 12-13 supra and notes 31-35 infra.
' See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4}(7); notes 31-35 infra.
" See I.R.C. 103(b)(2). In order to be an IDB, the bond must meet the statutory re-
quirements on "a major portion" of the bond proceeds and on "a major part" of the security
for payment of the "principal or interest". See id; text accompanying note 32 infra.
I See note 29 supra and text accompanying notes 31-35 infra. In order for the IDB to
be tax-exempt, the IDB must meet the statutory requirement that "substantially all" of the
proceeds be used in a specific manner. See I.R.C. 103(b)(6).
" See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)-(7). The rule that IDB's are taxable does not apply when
substantially all of the proceeds finance an "exempt activity". See id. (b)(4). Exempt ac-
tivities include, among others, low income residential projects, mass commuting facilities, or
air or water pollution control facilities. See id.; note 12 supra. See also Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 811(a) & 812(a) (1981) (enactment of § 103(bl(4)(I), ad-
ding qualified mass commuting facilities to § 103(b)(4)) (enactment of § 103(i), adding
volunteer fire departments as a political subdivision of state); Crude Oil Windfall Profits
Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 242(a)(1)(1980) (enactment of § 103(g), adding qualified
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finance certain exempt activities such as parking facilities, airports, and
pollution-control facilities.2 Section 103(b)(6) exempts small issues from
steam-generating and alcohol-producing facilities to § 103(b)(4)); Committee on Tax Exempt
Financing, Legislative Changes, 33 TAx LAW. 1490, 1490 (1979-1980); note 12 supra. Addi-
tionally, the rule that IDB's are taxable does not apply to bonds financing the acquisition of
land for industrial parks, financing hydroelectric generating facilities or financing qualified
public facilities, which are facilities listed 103(b)(4)(C) & (D) and generally available to the
public. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(5) & (b)(7)-(8).
' See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6); note 13 supra. For a bond to qualify as a small issue, the obliga-
tion first must be an IDB. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6); text accompanying note 29 supra. An IDB as
opposed to another form of municipal bond, must satisfy the "trade or business test" and
the "security interest test". See I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)(A)-(B); text accompanying notes 63-69 in-
fra. The trade or business test requires the beneficiary of the bond's proceeds (user) to ap-
ply "a major portion" of the bond's proceeds either directly or indirectly in any trade or
business which non-exempt persons conduct. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)(A) & (B); Treas. Reg. §
1.103-7(b)(3) (1972); Kirkpatrick v. United States, 605 F.2d 1160 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1075 (1980) (indirect use of bond proceeds rendered bonds IDBs under trade or
business test); text accompanying notes 63-68 infra. An exempt person is a governmental
unit or a tax-exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), typically a corporation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes. See
I.R.C. § 103(b)(3)(A)-(B); id. § 501(c)(3).
The security interest test examines both the source for the payment of the principal or
interest and the type of security provided for the payment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(4)
(1972). The test requires the user to provide security for payment of at least "a major part"
of the principal or interest. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(2(B)(i); text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
To determine the nature and source of security for payment of an IDB, the Treasury ex-
amines the terms of the bond and all the underlying arrangements. See I.R.C. §
103(b(2)(BI(ii). If the obligor of the bond pledges property as security for the payment of the
bond, the property need not be property financed by the proceeds of the bond in question.
See id
If an obligation fails either the trade or business test or the security interest test, the
obligation is not taxable under § 103(b). See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)-(7). But unless the bond
qualifies for another exemption, such as the § 103(a)(1) tax exemption for states and their
political subdivisions, the interest earned on the bond is taxable. See id. (b)(4)-(7); 605 F.2d at
1163; text accompanying note 25 supra. Alternatively, if the user satisfies both tests the
bond is an IDB, and the IDB is tax-exempt only if it qualifies as a small issue under §
103(b)(6) or if the proceeds of the IDB finance an exempt activity provided by §§ 103(b)(4-(5)
or 103(b)(7-(8). See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)0(8); text accompanying notes 12-13 supra & notes 33-39
infra.
Other requirements for the small issue and exempt activities IDBs include the
"substantially all" test, which requires the user to expend substantially all of the bond pro-
ceeds for the purposes which § 103(b) requires. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)-(7); Treas. Reg. §§
1.103-8(a)(1) -10(b)(1)(ii) (1980); text accompanying notes 33 & 71-73 infra. Further, to classify
an IDB project as an exempt activity (exempt facility), the IDB must meet both "public use"
and "official action" requirements. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.103-8(a)(2) &-(5)(ii)-(iv) (1980). Before
construction of an exempt facility, the issuer should have a bond resolution adopted or
should take other official action to determine whether the bond qualifies as an exempt facility
under § 103(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(5(ii)-(iv) (1980); R. PRICE, supra note 7, at 16; note
85 infra. The public use requirement generally demands that the user of the tax-exempt
facility directly serve the public. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(2) (1980); Rev. Rul. 76-494,
1976-51 I.R.B. 7; Roberts, Industrial Development Bond Financing: Section 103(b) Examin-
ed, 32 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 1, 20-21 (Tax 1979) [hereinafter cited as Roberts]. The I.R.a. recently
announced that small issues also must meet official action requirements, yet small issues
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tax regardless of the use of the proceeds of the issue3 if the aggregate
authorized face amount of the bond is $1 million or less.Y Another form
of small issue includes obligations of $10 million or less if the $10 million
includes certain capital expenditures incurred during a specified six-
year period. 5
have no public purpose requirements. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.103-8(a)(5) & -10(b)(1)(ii) (1980); R.
PRICE, supraz note 7, at 16; Roberts, supra at 21; text accompanying notes 33-34 infra. Final-
ly, an otherwise tax-exempt IDB is taxable while the IDB is held by a substantial user of the
facilities. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(10); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-11 (1972) (substantial user is non-exempt
person deriving more than 5% of total IDB revenue or occupying more than 50 of the ex-
empt facility's usable area); R. PRICE, supra note 7, at 22.
See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A). Although § 103(b)(6) does not generally restrict the use of
proceeds from tax-exempt small issues, substantially all of the bond proceeds must provide
for the acquisition, construction or improvement of depreciable land or property. See I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(6)(A)(i). See also note 59 infra. Alternatively, the small issue proceeds may finance
the redemption of part or all of a prior issue if the prior issue meets the requirements of §
103(b)(6). See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A)(ii). A prior issue will not satisfy the § 103(b)(6) re-
quirements unless substantially all of the prior issue's proceeds provide for the acquisition,
construction or improvement of depreciable land or property. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A)(ii);
note 32 supra & notes 34-35 infra.
3 I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A). Addingthe face amount of the bond issue with the outstanding
face amount of certain prior issues determines the aggregate authorized face amount of the
1DB. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(B); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.103-10(b)(1)(i) & -10(d)(2)(i) (1977). The issuer
must employ two principal tests to determine which prior issues the issuer should include in
the aggregate face amount of the $1 million IDB. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6})(-ii); Treas. Reg. §
1.103-10(d)(2(i-(ii) (1977); Roberts, supra note 32, at 31-42. If the facility financed from the
prior exempt small issue is located either in the same incorporated municipality or in the
same county as is the project financed by the IDB in question, then the "jurisdictional test"
requires inclusion of the outstanding amount of the prior issue in the aggregate face amount
of the IDB, provided the "principal user test" also is satisfied. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(B)(i);
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10(d)(2)(i) (1977); Roberts, supra note 32, at 32; note 59 infra. To satisfy
the principal user test, the principal user of a facility financed by a prior exempt small issue
must be the same person as, or a related person to the principal user of the project financed
by the IDB in question. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6}{B)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10(d)(2)(ii); Roberts,
supra note 32, at 35-36; note 74 infra. See also I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(C) (definition of related per-
son); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10(e) (1977) (same).
See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D). Although the $1 million small issue remains intact with no
capital expenditure requirements, an issuer electing certain capital expenditure restrictions
may issue a $10 million 1DB. See id.; Treas. Reg. 1.103-10(b)(2)(vi) (1977). See also Pub. L. No.
95-6500, §§ 331-334 (1978) (raising IDB maximum face amount to $10 million); Pub. L. No.
90-634, § 401 (1968) (amending Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107) (creating $5 million IDB); I. COHEN,
supra note 19, at 73 (outline of 1968 amendments of I.R.C. § 103); Roberts, supra note 32, at
1-3 (1968 amendments); notes 57 & 74 infra. The issuer of a $10 million small issue must take
into account capital expenditures paid or incurred during the six-year period starting three
years before and ending three years after the date of issuance. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)(ii);
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10(b)(2)(ii) (1977); note 77 infra. To determine whether a capital expen-
diture is includable in the aggregate face amount of a $10 million small issue IDB, the issuer
must satisfy the jurisdictional test and the principal user test, which are essentially the
same tests used for qualifying includable prior issues under the $1 million limit. See I.R.C. §
103(b)(6)(E); note 34 supra. The jurisdictional test requires the issuer to include in the ag-
gregate face amount of the $10 million IDB only those capital expenditures for facilities
located either in the same county or in the same incorporated municipality. See I.R.C. §
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The purpose of the creation of the small issue accords with the
original purpose of IDBs generally, which is to provide a means for en-
couraging the expansion of small industries, particularly in economically
distressed areas." Much of the congressional debate preceding the 1968
Act concerned the use of the IDB tax exemption by large corporations to
construct facilities located in large metropolitan areas." Congress
designed the 1968 Act to eliminate virtually all IDB financing for pro-
jects that did not conform to the original purposes of the IDB tax exemp-
tion. 8 Since large corporations were the primary users of IDBs, few
IDBs conformed to the original purposes of the IDB tax exemption. 9 The
real legislative purpose of the 1968 Act, therefore, was to prevent large
corporations from abusing the original purposes of the IDB tax exemp-
tion." By creating the second exception for exempt activity IDBs, Con-
gress promoted socially desirable projects, quasi-public services, and
other activities in which state or local governmental units are typically
involved." Thus, Congress intended the 1968 Act to eliminate the abuse
of the tax-exempt status of IDBs42 and to continue the tax exemption for
103(b)(6)(D){ii)-(E)(i); note 59 infra. Under the principal user test, the principal user of a facility
is the same person as, or a related person to the principal user of the project financed by the
IDB in question. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)(ii)-(E}(ii). Therefore, when the issuer has made ex-
penditures with respect to facilities located in the same county or municipality as the IDB
project in question, when the issuer is the principal user of the facilities, and when the
issuer has made the expenditures within the statutory six-year period, then the expen-
ditures are capital expenditures includable in the aggregate $10 million maximum face
amount of the IDB. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)-(E); Roberts, supra note 32, at 43.
"' See Note, The Importance of Assessing Business Transactions for Their Impact
Upon the Tax-Exempt Status of Industrial Development Bonds, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 705,
713 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Impact Upon The Tax-Exempt Status]; Limited Tax-Exempt
Status, supra note 2, at 1656, 1660; text accompanying note 17 supra.
3 See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 7681 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire); 114 CONG. REC.
7693-7701 (1968) (compilation of all Mississippi IDB's 1938-1967 including size data); 114
CONG. REC. 7701-7702 (1968) (statement of Sen. Scott); Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra
note 2, at 1654; SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 9.
' See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 26414 (1968) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff); 114 CONG. REC.
26417 (1968) (statement of Sen. Baker); 114 CONG. REc. 26416 (1968) (statement of Sen. Cur-
tis); 114 CONG. Rc. 26417-26418 (1968) (editorial submitted by Sen. Baker); text accompany-
ing note 17 supra.
See text accompanying note 46 infra.
See generally notes 17 & 38 supra.
41 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 32, at 12-13; Impact Upon The Tax-Exempt Status,
supra note 36, at 712; Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1656; SMALL ISSUE,
supra note 5, at 2; note 12 supra. Congress apparently desired the exempt activities excep-
tion of § 103(b) to encourage private industry to assist in pr9viding certain public activities.
See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1656; note 12 supra. IDB's used to finance
public activities are sufficiently analogous to conventional municipal bonds to warrant tax
treatment identical to that of ordinary municipals. See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra
note 2, at 1656. The exempt activities covered in § 103(b) resemble typical state or local
government activities. See Roberts, supra note 32, at 12-13. If the governmental unit or
authority itself engages in the activity directly, the interest from the bond probably is tax-
exempt without any exception under § 103(b). See id. at 13.
412 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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IDBs when used for purposes which Congress found particularly suit-
able .
3
The 1968 Act resulted in near total eradication of tax-exempt IDBs."
Initially following the legislation,45 small issue IDBs comprised an insig-
nificant part of the total municipal bond market.46 The combined volume
of both the small issues and the exempt activity issues after the 1968
Act was less than three percent of the volume of all IDBs before the 1968
Act."' The rate of growth of small issues was slow during the early
seventies,48 yet today the level of small issue IDBs has risen more than
' See, e.g., CONFERENCE CoMM., 90th CONG., 2d SESS., REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CON-
TROL ACT OF 1968, EXPLANATION OF THE BILL H.R. 15414 As AGREED TO IN CONFERENCE 1, 14
(Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE CoMM., 90th CONG.]; CONFERENCE
COMM., 90th CONG., 2d SESS., CONFERENCE REPORT ON REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL
ACT OF 1968, STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS 32-33 (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as
STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS]; Impact Upon The Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 36, at
712-713; Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1655-1656; text accompanying notes
31-32 supra. I.R.C. § 103(b) represents a compromise to eliminate the unfavorable aspects of
IDB practice, evidenced by the over-use of IDBs by large corporations, and to preserve the
assistance to small industires in economically undeveloped areas. See Limited Tax-Exempt
Status, supra note 2, at 1655-1656; Impact On The Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 36, at
713. See also SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 2; CONFERENCE COMM., 90th CONG., supra at 1 &
14-18. During the congressional debates preceding the 1968 Act, opponents of the tax ex-
emption of IDBs contended that one of the original purposes of IDB financing was to pro-
mote the development of rural communities. See 114 CONG. REC. 7685 (1968) (editorial sub-
mitted by Sen. Proxmire); Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1654; text accom-
panying note 17 supra. Since ID1s were not targeted to any one type of area, the opponents
argued that IDB financing encouraged pirating of firms away from an economically distressed
area, thereby defeating the original purpose of IDB financing. See Limited Tax-Exempt
Status, supra note 2, at 1654-1655; text accompanying notes 17-24 supra & note 122 infra.
" See CONFERENCE CoMM., 90th CONG., supra note 43, at 14; I. COHEN, supra note 19, at
82 (senate version of H.R. 15414 removing tax-exempt status from all IDBs); Hellige, supra
note 19, at 300; Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 335 and 543 (97% drop in
tax-exempt IDB volume from 1968 to 1969); Impact Upon The Tax-Exempt Status, supra
note 36, at 712; text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
'* See Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a)
(1968); text accompanying notes 11 & 22-23 supra.
' See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 535; note 47 infra.
' See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 535. In 1967, tax-exempt IDBs
constituted approximately 9% of the total long-term tax-exempt municipal bond market.
See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 9. See also Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at
1651 (1967 volume of IDB sales estimated at $1.3 billion). The 1968 Act reduced IDB volume
by 97%, from an estimated $1.8 billion before the 1968 Act to $51 million following the 1968
Act. See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 535; text accompanying note 46
supra. By extrapolation, 97% reduction of the 9% share of the municipal bond market im-
plies that the volume of all tax-exempt IDBs just after the 1968 Act was slightly more than
1lOth of 1% of the market share. See note 51 infra. See generally SMALL ISSUE, supra note
5, at 8-12. This amount reflects the volume of small issues and the issues for the remaining
exempt activities. Thus, for small issues alone, the market share would be even less than
1/1Oth of / of the market share. See id.
"3 See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 12. The slow growth'of small issues continued
even after Congress amended the definition of small issues to include $5 million issues if the
issuer accounted for certain capital expenditures and prior issues when calculating the $5
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160-fold since 1968, a result Congress neither intended nor foresaw.49
The estimated annual volume of small issues alone exceeds $8.4 billion.'
Even accounting for inflation, the increase of IDB use far exceeds the
alarming IDB levels reached before the 1968 Act.5 ' The concern before
the 1968 Act that IDBs erode the federal tax base still exists, and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated the loss from IDBs of
fiscal year 1981 revenue at over $1 billion.2
In view of the increasing popularity of IDB financing, the question
arises how effective IDBs are in attracting and creating industries which
will alleviate unemployment and promote the econ6my. Industrial loca-
tion specialists conclude that the availability of IDB financing is not
determinative in locating a project.M Also, in labor-intensive industries
million. See Pub. L. 90-364, § 401 (1968); note 35 supra. Although small issue volume grew
slowly, the volume of exempt activities grew rapidly in the early seventies. See Limited
Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1662. See also Industrial Location Incentives, supra
note 5, at 535 & 543 (explosive growth since 1977 of pollution bonds as exempt activity
IDBs).
" See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 12-13; Industrial Location Incentives, supra note
5, at 535. An increase from $51 million in volume of all IDB's following the 1968 Act to at
least $8.4 billion today of small issues alone represents an increase of 16,471%h, or an ap-
proximate 165-fold increase. See note 47-48 supra; text accompanying note 51 supra.
0 See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 14.
51 See Id., supra note 5, at 12-13. Although IDBs offered for public sale usually are
reported to the Daily Bond Buyer, bonds of smaller companies are often privately placed,
and therefore the only records appear in the county clerk's office or in the minutes of the
local issuing agency's meetings. See id at 13. Accordingly, IDB use since 1968 has been
understated significantly, and measuring the volume of small issues today with any preci-
sion is virtually impossible. See id.
One result of the 1968 Act increasing IDB sales volumes rather than decreasing
volumes as expected was to make IDBs less regressive. See note 20 supra. When the
volume of municipal bonds including IDBs increases, the market pressure forces interest
rates up in the tax-free municipal bond market. See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra
note 2, at 1659; note 20 supra. As the interest rate rises, the discount between yields on tax-
able and tax-free bonds shrinks, and more taxpayers with lower marginal tax rates find
IDBs and other municipals attractive. See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at
1659; note 2 supra. Thus, rather than eliminate the tax haven for high marginal rate tax-
payers, the 1968 Act has widened an arguable tax loophole to include low marginal rate tax-
payers. See Limited Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 2, at 1659; note 21 supra.
' See, e.g., Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 542; Limited Tax-Exempt
Status, supra note 2, at 1653-1654; SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 9 & 40 (table of projected
federal revenue losses from IDBs, 1979-1986); Senate Hearings on H.R. 15414, supra note 17,
at 108-115; note 20 supra. The estimated amount of loss from IDBs in revenues to the
federal government in 1981 is $1.038 billion. See SMALL ISSUES, supra note 5, at 40. The pro-
jected loss from IDBs of federal revenues in 1986 is $2.880 billion. See id. Additionally, since
small issues are tax-exempt under most state and local tax laws, including in some states
property tax laws, IDBs result in state and local revenue losses. See id. at 46.
" See H. CONWAY, LEGISLATIVE CLIMATE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27 (1979);
GRANT & COMPANY, STUDY OF BUSINESS CLIMATES OF THE FORTY-EIGHT CONTIGUOUS STATES
OF AMERICA 3-4 (1979); H. STAFFORD, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITY LOCATION 74 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as H. STAFFORD]; Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 523 n.34,
545, & 548-49. But see text accompanying note 76 infra. In a student survey of two hundred
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such as leather, textiles and apparel, industrial location incentive pro-
grams which attract industry by providing cheaper capital are capable of
overcoming only small differentials in labor costs." Accordingly, while
labor intensive industries would alleviate most effectively unemploy-
ment within a state, IDB financing as an industrial location incentive will
least benefit the labor-intensive industries and thus will not efficiently
alleviate unemployment.5 Moreover, while IDB financing occasionally is
the deciding factor in choosing one location over another once within a
region, IDB financing ranks low in the selection of the region of indus-
trial location."
Although the dollar limits of small issues prevent many larger cor-
porations from using the small issue exception, corporations operating
many geographically dispersed, low-cost facilities often use small issues
advantageouslyY The reason small issues are effective for certain cor-
porations is related to the jurisdictional test for aggregating the total
and sixty firms which had located new facilities within the previous five years, state and
local financial incentives ranked sixth on a scale of one to ten as an industrial location incen-
tive, one being the most important factor. See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5,
at 523 n.34. Access to dependable sources of energy, the area's prevailing wage rate, the
state's corporate income tax, the supply of skilled labor, and proximity to markets all rank-
ed higher than state or local governmental financial incentives. See id. Market accessibility
is a major factor affecting the choice of industrial location and is growing atthe expense of
labor and raw material accessibility. See H. HUNKER, supra note 6, at 88. The industrial loca-
tion incentives ranking lower than the governmental financial incentives were environmen-
tal laws and regulations, proximity to materials, stable state personal tax rates, and
noneconomic personal considerations. See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at
523. Furthermore, IDB financing ranked third out of four in a choice between location incen-
tives available at the local level. See id. at 546 (grouping with general obligation bonds).
More favorable as incentives were the extension of sewer and water lines to the plant
without direct cost to the firm and a property tax moratorium. See id. at 668.
" See H. STAFFORD, supra note 53, at 74; Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5,
at 547; note 8 supra.
See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 547.
See H. STAFFORD, supra note 53, at 73-74. But see text accompanying note 76 infra.
5' See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 23; text accompanying notes 14 & 34-35 supra &
note 82 infra. In 1980, K-Mart, the number two retailer in the country, financed 35 stores
with small issues. See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 23. Between 1975 and 1980, K-Mart
financed 96 stores in 19 states for $220.5 million of small issue IDBs. See id. In 1979,
McDonald's used IDBs to open 32 stores just in Pennsylvania and Ohio. See id. Kroger, Pep-
sico, Nabisco, Proctor and Gamble, General Mills, Burlington Industries, Eckerd Drug
Stores and Federated Department Stores are other major retailers, manufacturers and For-
tune 500 firms which are taking advantage of small issue IDBs. See id. at 23-24.
Approximately half of the Fortune 500 firm small issues are for exactly $1 million. See
id at 24. The CBO explains that for many large corporations which cannot otherwise advan-
tageously use small issues, these corporations employ a $1 million small issue as part of a
larger bond issue. See id. The corporation using a large pollution bond, for example, could
also use a small issue $1 million IDB for general expenses. See id. Whereas the pollution
bond proceeds have restricted uses, § 103(b)(6) requires no specific use of the small issue
proceeds, and the corporation might use the $1 million to purchase equipment, for example',
at a lower cost than taxable financing could yield. See id.; notes 33-35 supra.
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face amount of the IDBs 8  Provided the facilities financed by each indivi-
dual small issue IDB are located in different counties or municipalities,
section 103(b)(6) does not prevent a corporation from financing with more
than one small issue IDB.59 Therefore, manufacturers with many small
plants, fast food chains and national retailers are particularly suited to
finance major expansion programs with small issues." While other more
conventional types of financing are available, large corporations are
nonetheless using small issues and abusing the section 103(b)(6) tax ex-
emption since the purpose of small issues was to help small, not large in-
dustries. 1
Abuse of small issues also results from inconsistent and ambiguous
interpretations of the language in section 103(b).2 Section 103(b) sets
forth restrictions on both "a major portion" of the bond proceeds used in
a trade or business, 3 and "a major part" of the security of the bond."
The bond must comply with both restrictions to be an IDB."5 The Trea-
sury Department defined a major portion of the proceeds as at least
twenty-five percent 6 and later interpreted a major part to mean a major
portion. 7 Confusion continues to exist, however, with respect to the pro-
per method of calculating the twenty-five percent.8 Moreover, when
See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(B)(i); text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6). Although a company can use small issues in different jurisdic-
tions, the I.R.S. recently eliminated umbrella issues, or multiple IDBs issued simultaneously
for projects in different counties or municipalities. See Rev. Rul 8i-216 (1981); cf. Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(6) & -(c) (Oct. 8, 1981) (superseding Rev. Rul. 81-216) (obligations
under § 103(b) are part of same issue if sold at substantially same time, pursuant to common
marketing plan, and at substantially same interest rate); R. PRICE, supra note 7, at 80-84
(reprint of proposed regulation).
60 See note 57 supra.
6 See note 57 supra and text accompanying note 36 supra.
6 See Roberts, supra note 32, at 54; notes 63-74 infra.
" See notes 29 & 32 supra.
See notes 29 & 32 supra.
'5 See notes 29 & 32 supra.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b}(3)(iii) (1972). When two or more non-exempt persons use
IDB proceeds, the aggregate of each person's portion determines whether 25% or more of
the proceeds are used in a trade or business. See id If the aggregate is more than 25%, the
bond is an IDB, taxable under I.R.C. § 103(b)(1). See id.; note 32 supra.
67 See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(1)(ii); note 32 supra.
U See Roberts, supra note 32, at 6. The Treasury Regulations do not construe con-
sistently "a major portion" of IDB proceeds. One Treasury Regulation example examined
only the percentage of floor space used by the non-exempt person to determine whether the
"major portion" percentage of the trade or business test was satisfied. See Treas. Reg. §
1.103-7(c), Example (6)(b) (1972); Rev. Rel. 79-282, 1979-39 I.R.B. 8. In another example, the
Treasury qualified only the reasonable rental value of the space used by the non-exempt
person. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(c), Example (7) (1972). The inconsistency notwithstanding,
a possibility of abuse exists in both examples. In the former example, the Treasury in
calculating the major portion did not take into account varying costs of different spaces
within the same facility. In the latter example, the Treasury ignored the possibility that not
all the space within the facility has the same rental value. See Roberts, supra note 32, at 6.
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defining a major part of the security, the conjunction "or" employed in
the term "principal or interest" leads to a confusing result." The secur-
ity for at least twenty-five percent of the principal or interest arguably
could mean security for twelve and one-half percent of the principal and
twelve and one-half percent of the interest, rather than twenty-five per-
cent of the sum of principal plus interest. Section 103(b) and the relevant
Treasury Regulations are ambiguous." The "substantially all" require-
ment of the small issue and exempt activities IDBs requires substantial-
ly all of IDB proceeds to be spent on the IDB project.71 The Treasury has
defined substantially all as ninety percent.7 Calculation of ninety per-
cent, however, raises more interpretational problems.71 One example is
the case of an IDB user trying to spend pr6ceeds on other than the IDB
project, yet manipulating the technical terms to meet the "substantially
all" test for tax-exempt purposes.74
" See I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)(B); text accompanying notes 70-73 infra.
"0 See I.R.C. § 103(b)(2}(B); Roberts, supra note 32, at 10. But see Treas. Reg. §
1.103-7(c), Example 6(b) (1972) (bonds are IDBs because security for major part of principal
and interest).
' See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4-(7); notes 29 & 32 supra.
" See Treas. Reg. §r 1.103-8(a)(1}(i) (1980); note 32 supra. In 1977, the Treasury amended
the ambiguous provisions of the Treasury Regulations to specify that, with regard to ex-
empt activities, "substantially all" requires at least 90 percent. See Treas. Reg.' §
1.103-8(a}(1)(i) (1980); Roberts, supra note 32, at 13. The Regulation also states that the 900/o
rule applies to small issues. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10(b)(1)(ii) (1977). In calculating 90%, the
use of bond proceeds for any purpose other than for the exempt activity or small issue facility
reduces pro-rata the amount of the proceeds included in the 90% calculation. See Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.103-8(a)(1}(i) & -10(b)(1}(ii). Further, when calculating the amount of proceeds for
the substantially all requirement, the borrower may include all amounts paid or incurred
which are chargeable to the facility's capital account. See id. The borrower may include
amounts paid or incurred which could be chargeable either by a taxpayer's proper election
or chargeable but for the taxpayer's election to deduct the amounts. See id. The Treasury
apparently accepts the inclusion for the substantially all requirement of all facility costs
regardless of whether deducted or capitalized on the owner's income tax return. See
Roberts, supra note 32, at 13-14; note 73 infra.
", See Roberts, supra note 32, at 14. An ambiguous result is possible when calculating
the substantially all requirement necessary for an IDB to be tax-exempt. See id.; note 32
supra. Assume, for example, working capital totals$150 thousand of a $2 million bond issue,
and the qualifying costs total exactly 90% of the bond issue. See id. If the interest earned
on the I1DB proceeds during the period of construction in $200 thousand and is expended for
qualifying costs, the percentage of the DB proceeds used for the exempt'activity is 91.2%.
See id. at 15 n.70. If, however, this interest earned is used as additional working capital, a
nonqualifying cost, then the percentage is 79.4%. See id. Thus, in the latter case, the sub-
stantially all requirement would not be met, and the IDB would be taxable. See id.
Another confusing, complex area relating to small issues involves the definition of
principal users of "refunding" small issues. See F. Ballard, Industrial Development Financ-
ing, in BASICS FOR MUNICIPAL BoND LAWYERS 78 (1980) (R. Amdursky, ed.) [hereinafter cited
as F. Ballard]; notes 33-34 supra. Neither the I.R.C. nor the Treasury Regulations define
"principal user", but a Treasury-Regulation implies that a principal user is a person who
uses more than 10 percent of the 1DB proceeds. See Treas. Reg. 1.103-8(a)(6) (1980); F.
Ballard, supra at 78-81; R. PRICE, supra note 7, at 17. Since 90% is "substantial", then a user
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The most serious abuse of the small issue results from broad con-
struction of state IDB enabling statutes." A community that needs to
of less than 10% cannot be a substantial user. See Treas. Reg. 1.103-8(a)(1) (1980); R. PRICE,
supra note 7, at 5. Treasury Regulation § 1.103-8(a)(6) implies, therefore, that a user of more
than 10% is a principal user. See F. Ballard, supra at 78-79. Further, the I.R.S. has stated
that the Service generally will treat a non-exempt person as a principal user if the person
occupies more than 10% of the space or receives more than 10% of the revenues earned
from an IDB project. See Private Letter Ruling 8012065 (Dec. 27, 1979).
A final area of complexity and possible confusion is interpretation of -the $10 million
small issue capital expenditure requirements. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(B); Impact Upon The
Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 36, at 729; note 35 supra. See generally Roberts, supra note
32, at 42-52; Wade, Industrial Development Bonds-The Capital Expenditure Rule for
$10,000,000 Small Issues, 34 Bus. LAW. 1771, 1771-1787 (1979). The user of bond proceeds
must scrutinize carefully all of the capital expenditures during the entire six-year period,
within which capital expenditures are includable in the aggregate face amount of a $10
million IDB. See Impact Upon The Tax-Exempt Status, supra note 36, at 729; note 35 supra.
Proper interpretation of the complex capital expenditure rules becomes critical when, for
example, a purchaser of temporary mobile homes intends to sell the homes after completion
of the project's construction. The I.R.S. may label the expenditures capital expenditures.
See Rev. Rul. 75-208, 1975-1 C.B. 46. Although the purchaser uses the mobile homes only for
office space during the construction of the IDB-financed building, the I.R.S. might include
the price of the mobile homes in the $10 million maximum aggregate face amount of the tax-
exempt IDB. See id. Moreover, the proceeds from the subsequent sale of the mobile homes
probably will not offset the aggregate face amount of the IDB for capital expenditure pur-
poses. See id. at 47.
"' See Roberts, supra note 32, at 6; note 68 supra.
" See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. Financing private projects with IDB pro-
ceeds has met with unsuccessful state constitutional challenges. See generally Mitchell v.
North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 146, 159 S.E.2d 745, 755 (1968)
(survey of constitutional challenges); note 81 infra. One common state constitutional
challenge to IDB financing would hold that the proceeds of the IDBs were for private, not
public purposes, contrary to the "public purpose" doctrine of the state's constitution. See,
e.g., State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 785 (Fla. 1952); Lowell v. City of Boston,
111 Mass. 454, 457 (1873); Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 230, 82 N.W.2d 269, 274 (1957).
The public purpose doctrine requires a publicly funded project to promote either public
health or safety, general welfare, security or prosperity, or morals of those under control of
the governing body. See, Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose
Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 171, 176 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Tew]. Normally, if the
public benefit is sufficient, the bond project can incidentally benefit a private party. See
State v. City of Miami, 379 So.2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1980); Tew, supra at 177. A Florida court has
held that if a sufficient public purpose exists, the project's primary beneficiary can be a
private party. See State v. Housing Fin. Auth. of Polk County, 376 So.2d 1158, 1160 (Fla.
1980); note 81 supra.
The other major state constitutional argument against IDB's has been the IDB's con-
stitute an impermissable extension of public credit. See, eg., Wayland v. Snapp, 334 S.W.2d
633, 637 (Ark. 1960); Mitchell v. North Carolina Development Financing Authority, 273 N.C.
137, 140, 159 S.E.2d 745, 749 (1968); Beck v. York, 164 Neb. 223, 230, 82 N.W.2d 269, 274
(1957). A typical credit clause generally prohibits lending the credit of a state, municipality
or other governmental unit to aid an individual or private corporation. See Beck v. York,
164 Neb. 223, 226, 82 N.W.2d 269, 271 (1957); Constitutional and Pragmatic Obstacles, supra
note 5, at 434.
Although proceeds for IDBs are raised under the auspices of the governmental
authority, the bonds are backed only by the credit of the private user. See R. PRICE, supra
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attract new business, to persuade existing firms to remain, or to demon-
strate favorable attitudes toward business, generally finds IDBs an im-
portant component of the package of investment incentives. 6 Since all
states have authorized some form of IDB,7 the states are under a contin-
uing pressure to construe more broadly the enabling statutes for com-
petitive reasons."
Virginia has followed the trend of states broadly construing their
own IDB enabling statutes.79 In City of Lexington v. Industrial Develop-
ment Authority,"0 the-Virginia Supreme Court upheld the public purpose
of a national retailer's commercial project under Virginia's IDB enabling
statute and thus bestowed on local government authorities much
broader discretion to authorize the issuance of IDBs than ever before in
Virginia.' In City of Lexington, the Industrial Development Authority of
Rockbridge County (Authority) adopted a resolution for the issuance of a
$400,000 IDB for acquiring, constructing and equipping a retail sales
facility.82 Since the aggregate authorized face amount of the bond was
less that $1 million, the bond feasibly could qualify as a small issue IDB
under section 103(b)(6), and the interest received by bondholders would
note 7, at 1. Since the IDB is not backed by any "full faith and credit" of the governmental
authority, however, IDBs arguably do not violate credit clauses. See note 21 supra and note
84 infra. Some jurisdictions have enacted separate constitutional provisions for IDBs. See
note 5 supra.
"' See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 46. But see text accompanying notes 53 & 56
supra.
See note 13 supra.
78 See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 26415 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire); 114 CONG. REC.
26419 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke); SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 46; note 43 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
80 221 Va. 876. 275 S.E.2d 888 (1981).
a' See id. at 881; text accompanying notes 93-96 infra. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court established the public purpose doctrine in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa.
147, 185 (1853) (public purpose requirement implicit in Pennsylvania state constitution). See
Constitutional and Pragmatic Obstacles, supra note 6, at 432. Since 1938, the federal courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have ruled only on ancillary issues concerning
state and local issuance of bonds, rather than ruling on basic underlying principles. See In-
dustrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 538. See generally Carmichael v. Southern
Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 514 (1937) (public purpose doctrine is requirement of fourteenth
amendment); Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 262 U.S. 710, 721 (1923)
(determination of public purpose entitled to highest respect); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233,
242 (1920) (judgment of state's highest court declaring given use to be public in nature ac-
cepted by Court unless clearly'unfounded); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, -,
178 So. 799, 810, appeal dismissed per curiam, 303 U.S. 627 (1938) (United States Supreme
Court closing door on federal review of principles underlying IDB financing); note 18 infra.
I See 221 Va. at 876, 275 S.E.2d at 889; text accompanying note 57 supra. The Indus-
trial Development Authority of Rockbridge County (Authority) adopted a bond resolution
on December 5, 1979 which authorized both the issuance of $400,000 for financing a retail
sales facility and the leasing and sale of the facility to an individual or a corporation for the
operation of a "K-Mart". See 221 Va. at 876, 275 S.E.2d at 889; Brief for Appellee, at 1, City
of Lexington v. Industrial Development Authority, 221 Va. 876, 876, 275 S.E.2d 888, 889
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
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be tax-free. 3 -The Authority issued the IDB pursuant to perceived
authority under Virginia's Industrial Development and Revenue Bond
Acts (Act). After the Authority resolved to issue the IDB, the Authority
instituted a bond validation proceeding in the Rockbridge County,
Virginia, Circuit Court under Virginia's Public Finance Act.85 The
Rockbridge County Circuit Court held the bonds valid.8 The City of Lex-
ington (Lexington) opposed the validation of the bonds and appealed to
the Virginia Supreme Court to contest the circuit court validation
decree."s
On appeal, Lexington opposed the bond validation on the ground
that the Act did not authorize the issuance of the bond. Lexington also
disputed the validation proceedings on jurisdictional grounds, contend-
ing that the Authority could not maintain a bond validation proceeding
See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6); note 13 supra.
See 221 Va. at 876, 275 S.E.2d at 889; VA. CODE § 15.1-1373 -91. The Virginia Indus-
trial Development and Revenue Bond Act (Act) authorizes the governing body of any
Virginia municipality to enact an ordinance to create a political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth. See VA. CODE § 15.1-1375(a). An Industrial Development Authority (IDB
Authority) has both public and corporate powers as delegated by the Act. See Indus. Dev.
Auth. v. LaFrance Cleaners & Laundry Corp., 216 Va. 277, 282, 217 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1975);
VA. CODE § 15.1-1376(a). The IDB Authority's powers are entirely vested in a seven-member
board of directors, who are appointed by the governing body of the municipality. See VA.
CODE § 15.1-1377. The Act vests an IDB Authority with the powers to borrow money from
the Commonwealth or any subdivision, agency or public instrumentality of the Com-
monwealth and to issue bonds and acquire real and personal property, pledging the facilities
and revenues therefrom. See VA. CODE § 15.1-1378. The Virginia Code deems that the bonds
do not constitute the debt or pledge of the faith or credit of the Commonwealth, and
therefore are not general obligation bonds. See VA CODE § 15.1-1380; note 21 supra. The Act
also gives an IDB Authority the powers to improve the properties, lease them and collect
rent from them, and to convey with or without consideration the properties to the lessee
when all indebtedness is paid off. See VA. CODE § 15.1-1378. The rents fixed by an IDB
Authority as lessor must be at least sufficient to pay the principal and interest of the bonds
and the cost of maintaining, repairing and operating projects as the debts become due. See
id. § 15.1-1382. An IDB Authority must be non-profit, with no part of its net earnings, if any,
inuring to the benefit of any individual, firm or corporation. See id.§ 15.1-1384 (net earnings,
if any, going to municipality).
"5 See i&; VA. CODE § 15.1-170 -227. The Virginia Public Finance Act establishes a pro-
cedure by which the "governing body" of a political subdivision that wishes to issue IDBs
may validate the legality of the bonds and establish the validity of the pledges and other ar-
rangements to pay off the bonds. See id. § 15.1-170 -227.
" See 221 Va. at 881, 275 S.E.2d at 889. The Rockbridge County Circuit Court deter-
mined that all of the Rockbridge County Industrial Development Authority's proceedings to
validate the IDB were valid, and that the project to finance a "K-Mart" constituted an
"authority facility" as defined in the Industrial Development and Revenue Bond Act. See id.
See id.
See Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 4. Lexington argued that the Virginia Code
§ 15.1-1374(d) definitions of "authority facility" and "facilities" limited an IDB Authority's
power to finance a "commercial enterprise" under the Act. See Brief for Appellee, supra
note 82, at 4. Included in the definition of authority facility are medical, pollution control
and industrial facilities, and facilities for the aged, for education, for parking, and for other
miscellaneous, specified purposes. See VA. CODE § 15.1-1374(d).
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under Virginia's Public Finance Act. 9 Lexington argued that the valida-
tion provision of the Public Finance Act applies only to a Board of Super-
visors, city council or other legislative authority in charge of governmen-
tal finances and not to an Industrial Development Authority" (IDB
Authority). Lexington also argued that IDBs for private projects would
give the private developer an unfair advantage over merchants unable
to finance with IDBs.91 Lexington further contended that IDB financing
would create unfair competition in the public bond market which would
hurt financing possibilities for municipal bonds issued for necessary
public improvements.9"
The Virginia Supreme Court in City of Lexington held. that "indus-
try" and "industrial" as used in the Act apply to commercial enterprises
which sell and supply goods93 as well as applying to manufacturing
plants, factories and mills.94 The court further ruled that a retail sales
facility is a commercial enterprise under the Act, 5 and that the Act
should promote development of retail sales facilities.98 Additionally, the
court found that an Industrial Development Authority is a political sub-
" See Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 4; text accompanying note 90 infra.
" See 221 Va. at 880, 175 S.E.2d at 891; Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 4. Lexing-
ton noted that the Virginia Public Finance Act defines "unit" as any county or muncipality
and defines "bonds" as obligations of a unit. See VA. CODE §§ 19.2-72(c) & (e); Brief for Ap-
pellee, supra note 82, at 4. Lexington argued that since § 19.2-72(f) defines revenue bonds as
bonds of a unit, the validation proceeding is available only to counties and cities, not to IDB
Authorities. See Brief for Appellee,'supra note 82, at 4. Lexington also argued that if §
15.1-214 of the Public Finance Act applied to IDBs, the later enactment of the Industrial
Development and Revenue Bond Act should have resulted in an amendment of Virginia's
Public Finance Act to account for IDB financing. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 4.
The Authority argued that the Authority's board of directors were a governing body under
§ 15.1-214 of the Public Finance Act. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 3-4.
9 See 221 Va. at 879, 275 S.E.2d at 890.
See id.; text accompanying note 21 supra.
221 Va. at 879, 275 S.E.2d at 891. Before holding that the Industrial Development
and Revenue Bond Act applies to commercial as well as industrial projects, the City of Lex-
ington court noted that the Virginia Supreme Court upheld that constitutionality of the first
Virginia IDB enabling act in Fairfax County Industrial Development Authority v. Coyner,
207 Va. 351, 150 S.E.2d 87 (1966) (Chapter 643, Acts of Assembly, 1964, p. 975). See 221 Va.
at 877, 275 S.E.2d at 891. The Coyner court held that the creation of an industrial develop-
ment authority to promote industrial development by clothing such authorities with the
power to finance and construct various facilities served a public purpose and was, therefore,
a proper governmental function. Id. at 358, 150 S.E.2d at 94. Coyner also held that Fairfax
County did not violate the credit clause in the Virginia constitution because neither the
state nor the county would be liable to pay the bonds. Id. at 358, 150 S.E.2d at 94. A year
after Coyner, Industrial Development Authority of the City of Chesapeake v. Suthers, 208
Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d 326 (1967), affirmed Coyner and upheld the constitutionality of the Indus-
trial Development and Revenue Bond Act. Id. at 61, 155 S.E.2d at 330-333. The Suthers
court stated that incidental benefit to private interests from the action of an IDB Authority
does not destroy the action's public purpose. Id. at 59, 155 S.E.2d at 333.
221 Va. at 879, 275 S.E.2d at 891.
'5 Id. at 880, 275 S.E.2d at 890; see VA. CODE § 15.1-1374(j).
221 Va. at 880, 275 S.E.2d at 891; see VA. CODE § 15.1-1375; note 102 infra.
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division of the Commonwealth 7 which properly brought the validation
proceeding under Virginia's Public Finance Act. 8
In reaching the decision that IDB financing of a private commercial
project constitutes a public purpose, the Virginia Supreme Court in City
of Lexington relied on Industrial Development Authority v. LaFrance
Cleaners.9 In LaFrance Cleaners, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
an IDB Authority's powers are legislative in nature."' The IDB Author-
ity, however, may exercise legislative powers only when promoting a
public purpose.' Furthermore, the LaFrance Cleaners court stated that
the elements listed in the Virginia legislature's statutory statement of
the Act's purpose" 2 are each an indicium of the public purpose.'1 More
importantly, the court found that a court may construe the terms of the
Act disjunctively to effect the obvious legislative intent. °4 Therefore,
the Virginia legislature has expressed by statute an intent to promote
"commercial enterprises".' °5
The court in City of Lexington reasoned that since a retail store
assembles, stores and sells products of agriculture, mining and industry,
the retailer's business met the Act's definition of "enterprise".' Relying
221 Va. at 881, 275 S.E.2d at 891.
98 Id.; see note 90 supra.
" See 221 Va. at 881, 275 S.E.2d at 890; 216 Va. 277, 217 S.E.2d at 879 (1975).
100 216 Va. at 281, 217 S.E.2d at 883; see note 101 infra.
101 216 Va. at 280, 217 S.E.2d at 882. In LaFrance Cleaners a laundry company chal-
lenged the validity of IDBs issued for another laundry facility. See id. at 278, 216 Va. at 880.
The circuit court for the city of Richmond, Virginia, granted an injunction which invalidated
the issuance of the bonds and interim financing, and enjoined the IDB Authority from bor-
rowing additional funds to finance the laundry. Id. at 279, 216 Va. at 881. The circuit court
reasoned that the legislative intent reflected in VA. CODE § 15.1-1375 expressly required the
IDB Authority's powers to be exercised for the benefit of the Commonwealth to increase
commerce and promote safety, health and welfare. See 216 Va. at 279, 217 S.E.2d at 881.
The lower court interpreted § 15.1-1375 to require that terms of the section be treated con-
junctively, not disjunctively. See 216 Va. at 279, 217 S.E.2d at 881. To evaluate public pur-
pose, therefore, courts can only look conjunctively at the elements of public purpose which
the legislature has described. See id. at 279, 217 S.E.2d at 881.
1'2 See VA. CODE § 15.1-1375. Section 15.1-1375 of the Virginia Code states that the
legislative intent for the Industrial Development and Revenue Bond Act is to promote in-
dustry and develop trade by encouraging, among other things, manufacturing, industrial
and commercial enterprises to locate and remain in Virginia. See id.; text accompanying
notes 105-106 infra.
"0 216 Va. at 280, 217 S.E.2d at 882; see 221 Va. at 878, 275 S.E.2d at 890.
"' 216 Va. at 280, 217 S.E.2d at 882; see Va. at 878, 275 S.E.2d at 890. In addition to dis-
junctively construing the terms of the Industrial Development and Revenue Bond Act (Act),
the court must rationally construe the Act so as not to defeat its purposes. See Norfolk So.
Ry. Co. v. Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 364, 68 S.E.2d 641, 643-4 (1952).
I" See VA. CODE § 15.1-1375; 221 Va. at 880, 275 S.E.2d at 889; text accompanying note
102 supra.
'" See 221 Va. at 879, 275 S.E.2d at 890. The Industrial Development and Revenue
Bond Act broadly defines "enterprise" as any industry which, among other things,
assembles, stores or sells products of agriculture, mining or industry. See VA. CODE §
15.1374(j)..
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on another jurisdiction's definition of industry as any business con-
ducted for profit"' and considering the Virginia Supreme Court's earlier
mandate to construe the Act liberally,"8 the City of Lexington court held
that "industry" and "industrial" under the Act include commercial enter-
prises."9 The Virginia Supreme Court construed the definition of retail
sales facility to fit the Act's definition of enterprise and then defined
"commercial" as a subset of industrial. Finally, the court reasoned that
the Virginia legislature's statement of the purpose of the act indicated
an intent to authorize IDB financing to.induce retail sales facilities to
locate in Virginia. 0
Many jurisdictions have not construed their IDB enabling statutes
as broadly as has Virginia, and a few jurisdictions still oppose IDB
financing."' The Idaho Supreme Court held Idaho's IDB enabling statute
unconstitutional"' because the tax exemption arbitrarily and unjustly
prefered one private enterprise over another."' The Idaho court stated
that if the state-favored industries were successfully managed, the state
through municipalities would increasingly control private business as
non-state-favored industries were forced out of business."4 The Idaho
court further noted that the tax exemption would cast additional tax
burdens on citizens and non-state-favored industries."' North Carolina
courts also do not regard IDB financing favorably, holding that an
authority whose primary function is to equip facilities for private enter-
prise does not serve a public purpose."0 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held the state's IDB enabling act unconstitutional" 7 because the
power of taxation may never be contracted away,"' and because it was
10 See 221 Va. at 879, 275 S.E.2d at 890, quoting Weatherford v. Arter, 135 W. Va. 391,
395; 63 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1951).
,10 See 221 Va. at 880, 275 S.E.2d at 890; note 104 supra.
1 See 221 Va. at 880, 275 S.E.2d at 890.
I See 221 Va. at 880, 275 S.E.2d at 889-891; text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
m See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 541; text accompanying note 13
supra & notes 112-19 infra.
See Village of Moyie Springs, Idaho v. Aurora Company, 82 Idaho 337, -, 353
P.2d 767, 775 (1960). Idaho's Code today provides for the issuance of IDBs by local units of
government only for deep water ports. See IDAHO CODE § 77-1901 to -1913.
11 See 82 Idaho at -, 353 P.2d at 775 (private enterprise not favored by IDBs could
not otherwise compete for industries using IDBs).
I See id. (socialism would replace free enterprise with influence of IDBs).
1 See id.; note 21 supra.
See Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 33, 199 S.E.2d 641,
658 (1973); Mitchell v. North Carolina Financing Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159, 159 S.E.2d 745,
761 (1968).
1" See Mitchell v. North Carolina Fin. Dev. Auth., 273 N.C. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 761
(1968).
"' See id. at 143, 159 S.E.2d at 749-750; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1963); N.C. CONST. art.
V, §§ 2(1) and 2(3) (current provision).
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not the North Carolina government's function to engage in private
business.
The reasoning of the Idaho and North Carolina courts is sound and
should be adopted by other states. Other states, however, have not
adopted similar reasoning, because there are competitive reasons for
states construing their respective enabling statutes more broadly. 10
Therefore, Congress must revise section 103(b) to prevent further
abuse.'21 Congress should deny the IDB tax exemption unless the issuer
targets the IDB to aid either small businesses, economically distressed
areas or industrial firms but not large, private commercial enterprises."
To define a "small business", Congress could rely on the Small Business
Administration criteria for defining small businesses"' or could limit
assistance according to a firm's capital assets."4 To determine whether
an area is economically distressed, criteria used in the Urban Develop-
ment Action Grant's"2 "pockets of poverty" program might be helpful.
8
Alternatively, Congress could restrict IDBs solely to areas of high
unemployment.1
27
Several other possible solutions exist to help solve small issue IDB
problems. Federal regulations could limit per state or per capita volume
of IDB sales." Individual states would then establish eligibility criteria
to meet the state's limit. 1"' With a fifty dollar per capita limit on the
volume of small issue sales per state, for example, the states might
authorize IDB financing more selectively."' Alternatively, Congress
... See 273 N.C. at 145, 159 S.E.2d at 758; Stanley v. Department of Conservation &
Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 35-41, 199 S.E.2d at 654-658 (1973) (affirming Mitchell). The North
Carolina legislature in 1975 approved a constitutional amendment to permit IDB financing
for industrial purposes only. See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 20; Subcomm. Hearings,
supra note 14, at 117 (Review of Borrowing Practices, Oregon Governor's Bonded Debt Ad-
visory Panel). Additionally, only industrial projects in North Carolina which create at least
100 jobs for each $7.5 million invested qualify for IDB financing. See SMALL ISSUE, supra
note 5, at 20.
120 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 122-138 infra.
' See H.R. 4420, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 21-22;
Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 547-550; SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 59-63.
The elimination of IDBs for commercial projects would ease the rapid growth of small
issues, and many larger corporations would find alternative financing. See SMALL ISSUE,
supra note 5, at 62-63; note 109 supra.
12 See SMALL ISSUE supra note 5, at 60.
12 See id.
1 See id. at 61 (UDAG); SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
12 See SMALL ISSUE, supra note 5, at 61.
See id.
2 See id. at 63-64. Several states have set $50 per capita limits, based on population,
on IDB sales volume. See id. at 64. Pennsylvania has the largest per capita average, $319.
See id. at 64 & 98. Alternatively, states could limit IDB's to areas with populations less than
50,000, or to areas with a labor surplus. See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at
549.
1 See id. at 63-64.
120 See id. at 64.
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could limit the tax exemption to general obligation bonds.13" ' Although
states or localities could still issue IDBs, the state or local government
would back the bonds by the full faith and credit of the state or local
government.132 Although this alternative would eliminate IDBs in most
states which have constitutional credit clauses prohibiting the state or
its political subdivisions from making loans or gifts to private parties,
the remaining states could permit governmental units to issue IDBs.13
The state or locality would stand behind the IDBs in case of default, and
the federal government could not interfere with local public purpose
determinations.13
A final alternative is to eliminate the small issue tax exemption en-
tirely.1 1 Because of the arguably remote public purpose of many small
issues and of the difficulty in drafting legislation which targets
assistance to businesses, industries, or regions that need assistance
most, Congress should consider elimination of the small issue.1 8 Of
course, elimination of the small issue could result in the loss of many pro-
jects, absent alternate financing methods.1 37 By contrast, the Treasury
would recoup lost tax revenues.1
In recent years, the volume of small issue IDBs has grown faster
than ever."9 Large national corporations are taking advantage of the
I.R.C. section 103(b)(6) tax exemption for small issues by financing major
expansion programs when other sources of financing are available. 4 The
1968 congressional intent for creating the small issue was to aid the
small corporation in economically distressed areas."' Not only does the
Treasury suffer large losses of income tax revenues,"' but municipalities
pay higher interest rates on true municipal bonds because of market
pressures the large volume of IDBs causes.' Since every state offers
some form of IDB14' and virtually all states allow small issue IDBs,M the
See id. at 64-65. By limiting the tax exemption to general obligation bonds, Congress
could avoid defining public purpose and 1DB qualifying criteria. See id. at 64; notes 6 & 21
supra.
1' See Industrial Location Incentives, supra note 5, at 64. An alternative to EDB financ-
ing would be to eliminate small issues except when the state or local governmental unit
pledges funds which match the amount of the -DB. See id. at 64. Under this plan, states
would be more selective in determinine whether to finance a project. See id.; notes 6, 21 &
77-78 supra.
'" See SMALL ISSUE supra note 5, at 65.
'3 See id. at 65; note 6 supra.
11 See SMALL ISSUE supra note 5, at 65.
' See id.
1" See id.
"' See note 52 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
,' See text accompanying notes 14 & 57-61 supra.,
"' See text accompanying notes 17 & 36-40 supra.
14 See text accompanying notes 20 & 52 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 21 & 50 supra.
' See text accompanying note 5 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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result is that courts construe more broadly state IDB enabling statutes,
thus permitting-IDB financing of commercial as well as industrial pro-
jects.14 The state trend is to construe their own enabling statutes more
liberally to maintain a competitive business climate.'47 To arrest this
trend, and thus to remedy the growing abuse of small issues, Congress is
the proper authority for action. 48 The best method of preventing abuse
of IDBs is to eliminate IDBs for private commercial purposes unless
targeted for small corporations or economically distressed areas.
4 9
GORDON W. STEWART
1"I See text accompanying notes 16 & 79-110 supra.
47 See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
148 See text accompanying note 121 supra.
19 See text accompanying notes 122-139 supra.
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